Download Appendix I

I.1 Introduction

I.2 Vessel Worst Case Discharge

I.2.1 NOSC Responsibilities
I.2.2 Immediate Notifications
I.2.3 Spill Emergency Action Checklist
I.2.4 Written Notification
I.2.5 Spill Documentation

I.2.5.1 Spill Assessment Form

I.2.5.2 Oil Spill Action Log

I.2.5.3 Telephone Log

I.2.6 Spill Analyses
I.2.7 Response Equipment

I.3 Facility Worst Case Discharge

I.3.1 Size of Discharge

I.3.1.1 Historical Spill Considerations

I.3.1.2 Hazard Assessment

I.3.1.3 Vulnerability Assessment

I.3.1.4 Risk Assessment

I.3.1.5 Seasonal Considerations
I.3.2 Event

I.3.2.1 Situation

I.3.2.2 Location

I.3.2.3 Type and Amount of Spill

I.3.2.4 Can Pollution Source Be Secured?

I.3.2.5 Sensitive Areas At Risk

I.3.2.6 Time of Year

I.3.2.7 On-Scene Weather
I.3.3 Initial Actions

I.3.3.1 Notifications

I.3.3.2 Activation of Response

1.3.3.3 Initial On-Scene Investigation and Recommendation

I.3.3.4 Initial Response Actions and Strategies
I.3.4 Spill Response Organizations

I.3.4.1 Initial Response

I.3.4.2 Additional Response Organizations
I.3.5 Containment, Countermeasures and Cleanup Strategies

I.3.5.1 Near Shore

I.3.5.2 Offshore

I.3.5.3 Shoreline

I.3.5.4 Inland

I.3.5.5 Sensitive Areas
I.3.6 Resource Requirements

I.3.6.1 Equipment

I.3.6.2 Personnel
I.3.7 Available Resources and Sources of Procurement

I.3.7.1 Primary Response Resources

I.3.7.2 Additional Resource Assistance

I.3.7.3 Response Time
I.3.8 Shortfalls and Options For Alleviating Them

I.3.8.1 Equipment

I.3.8.2 Personnel

I.3.8.3 Funds

I.3.8.4 Minimum Response Time

I.3.8.5 Location/ Identification of Additional Resources I.3.9 Time Required to Clean Up the Spill

I.3.9.1 Mechanical Cleanup Only

I.3.9.2 Mechanical Cleanup Combined With Other Methods

I.3.10 Storage/Disposal Options
I.3.11 Procedures/Criteria for Terminating the Cleanup

Appendix I: WORST CASE DISCHARGE SCENARIOS

This appendix is divided into two sections; a generic worst case discharge for a spill from a vessel within the NOSC Area of Responsibility, and a facility worst case discharge which represents the "worst of the worst" facility spill within the AOR.

Currently, public vessels are not subject to OPA 90 regulations. It is the Navy's policy, however, to provide proper stewardship for the environment and to operate in a manner consistent with federal, state and local environmental regulations. Since the NOSC is responsible for a vessel spill anywhere within the AOR, the vessel section of this appendix is designed to facilitate response to a spill from a variety of locations, ranging from pier side to a 12 nautical miles (NM) from the shoreline. This section contains generic checklists applicable to a spill, regardless of its location, and notifications that are specific to each COTP within the AOR.

All facilities are required to address their worst case discharge in their Facility Response Plan. In most cases, the facility will require the assistance of the NOSC in order to augment facility personnel in properly addressing a worst case discharge. Since the NOSC may be required to assist the facility in a major spill, the worst case scenario is located in this NOSC plan. The format of the facility worst case scenario is designed to accommodate regulators reviewing the various facility response plans. Only one worst case scenario (the "worst of the worst") has been included for each COTP Zone within the NOSC’s AOR, assuming that a command that can handle the worst of the worst can adequately handle spills of lesser volume.

I.2 Vessel Worst Case Discharge [top]

I.2.1 NOSC Responsibilities [top]

This section of the appendix is intended to assist NOSCs in responding to a major discharge from a Naval vessel anywhere within the NOSC AOR. This section should also assist the NOSC in responding to an oil spill, or HS release, when there is no obvious Incident Commander to initiate response actions.

When Naval vessels experience an oil spill while berthed at a facility, the facility usually initiates the initial response actions, and establishes an ICS structure. The NOSC monitors the situation, assisting as necessary. Since the shore side NOSC AOR for oil spill response extends seaward to 12 NM from the shoreline, there may be situations where the shore side NOSC encounters a spill when the vessel is not located at a facility. Under these circumstances the NOSC is responsible for verifying that the ship notified the NRC, for making other notifications specific to the AOR, for establishing a response organization, and for responding to the spill.

In many cases, especially for minor spills, the responsibility for initial notification and response is with the ship's Commanding Officer. However, regardless of the size of the spill, the ship may need assistance in responding to a spill, especially if the ship is not located at a facility. This is especially true in the case of MSC vessels.

Because of its mission, a MSC tanker generally presents the largest risk of an oil spill within a NOSC AOR. Therefore, the data and examples portrayed in this appendix are those of a T-AO Class 187 MSC tanker and are intended to illustrate the type of information that the NOSC will need to obtain from any vessel experiencing an oil spill.

This section provides the NOSC with the Spill Emergency Action Checklist (Table I-2) for initiating response actions. In addition, this section contains a number of sample tables and reports. San Diego COTP data are used in this appendix and are intended to illustrate the type of information that must be obtained to complete the forms and reports properly. Information specific to each COTP zone , i.e., federal, state, and local notifications, and local military and commercial responders, both BOA and non-BOA, (Table I-3, San Diego and San Francisco are used as examples) is located immediately behind the checklist. Additionally, a sample OPREP-3 NAVY BLUE message report (Figure I.1, San Diego is used as an example), sample Oil Spill or HS Release Report (Figure I.2 San Diego is used as an example), a Spill Assessment Form (Table I-4), an Oil Spill Action Log (Table I-5), and a Telephone Log (Table I-6) are provided.

The Incident Command System (ICS) concept will be used in all spill responses. The size and composition of the ICS team will vary, as determined by the Incident Commander, depending on spill size, location and conditions. The responsibilities and functions of the Incident Command System are contained in earlier chapters of this plan.

While every response may be treated differently, the following are appropriate initial actions:

• Ensure human health and safety;

• Secure the source of the spill;

• Minimize environmental impact and property damage; and

• Conduct clean up operations.

I.2.2 Immediate Notifications [top]

The NOSC will ensure that all appropriate organizations are notified. Federal regulations require that the National Response Center (NRC) is notified IMMEDIATELY when there is knowledge of any discharge of oil or hazardous substance. This notification is usually conducted by phone, however the NRC will also accept a fax notification. Failure to notify the appropriate agency is a violation of the law.

Some states also require immediate notification in the event of a spill. Unless otherwise indicated, this is interpreted to mean within 30 minutes of discovery of the discharge.

I.2.3 Spill Emergency Action Checklist [top]

The Spill Emergency Action Checklist, shown in Table I-2 may be used as a guide for notification and initial response procedures. Keep the completed form as a record of all response actions.

I.2.4 Written Notification[top]

Several states require submission of a written report following the verbal oil spill notification. Circumstances dictating written notification vary according to size, location and severity of the spill. Specific instructions for providing written notification to this state should be determined at the time of the initial verbal notification. The following example illustrates the type of information that the state of California requires. NOSCs will need to identify the specific state reporting requirements, as they apply to the NOSC AOR.

All oil spills producing a visible sheen, or HS spills, within the NOSC AOR, will be reported using the Oil Spill or HS Release Report (Figure I.2). Major oil spills or HS releases shall be reported via OPREP-3 NAVY BLUE (Figure I.1) special incident report.

An example of a completed OPREP-3 NAVY BLUE Report is shown in Figure I.1. A sample Oil Spill or HS Release Report (incorporating the requirements of both oil and HS formats) is shown in Figure I.2.

I.2.5 Spill Documentation [top]

All aspects of a spill, including actions taken, must be documented. Documentation will be needed for a final spill report, if required, and for legal claims. For most small spills, the Spill Emergency Action Checklist, Spill Assessment Form, and/or notification message will be the primary documentation. Navy messages should be used to document all significant actions such as official notifications, authorization of funding, SITREPs, and official requests.

As a supplement to the documentation, photographs are extremely helpful in documenting the location of the spill and assessing various response strategies.Photos should be taken of the spill as soon as possible, and of the progress of the spill as it spreads. Aircraft, if available, are exceptionally good platforms for taking these photos.

I.2.5.1 Spill Assessment Form [top]

All information about a spill should be recorded on the Spill Assessment Form (Table I-4). Fill in additional information as it is received throughout the spill response. The Spill Assessment Form may assist in the preparation of notification messages, SITREPs, and press releases, if necessary. It may be used as a quick reference for the status of the spill and to keep the status up to date.

I.2.5.2 Oil Spill Action Log [top]

The Oil Spill Action Log (Table I-5) should be utilized for more complex responses. This is a handwritten narrative log of all decisions and actions. Such a log is extremely useful to determine notification times, resources requested and ETAs, POCs, and reconstruction of response decisions and actions.

I.2.5.3 Telephone Log

A Telephone Log (Table I-6) should be used to log all incoming and outgoing calls and to summarize the discussions.

I.2.6 Spill Analyses [top]

Planning volume calculations for worst case discharge are reflected in the vessel's Planning Volumes and Recovery Requirements sheets (Table I-7). These planning volumes are based upon T-AO 187 Class MSC vessels (Table I-8), which would usually pose the largest planning volumes for ships under Navy jurisdiction. The planning volumes are shown for Near shore/Inland, Rivers, Offshore and Open Ocean for both On Water and On Shore removal capacity. These volumes are based on Group I product, and are the required level of response resources which may be anticipated.

I.2.7 Response Equipment [top]

The primary response oil recovery and storage devices, containment booms, shoreline protection resources, and disposal of recovered oil shall be provided by local response teams and Navy SUPSALV.

Insert Table I-7 Planning Volumes

Insert Table I-8 Vessel Diagram

I.3 Facility Worst Case Discharge (sample for COMNAVBASE San Diego) [top]

I.3.1 Size of Discharge

I.3.1.1 Historical Spill Considerations [top]

The Point Loma Fuel Facility has been in operation since 1904. Since that date, one incident of a tank spill reaching navigable waters and three incidents of pipeline ruptures reaching San Diego Bay have occurred. The following incidents represent spills that have occurred during the last five years.

On 2 May 1990, 400 gallons of oily waste water (mostly off-loaded diesel) were trapped in the concrete storm flume as a result of a hole in the 8" de-ballast line. An estimated 20-50 gallons escaped from the flume and entered San Diego Bay.

On 23 July 1989, an estimated 6,000-8,000 gallons of DFM was spilled from the USNS Kawishiwi (AO 146) while loading DFM. Two 10" cast-iron valve flanges had separated from the DFM Pump House. The spill reached San Diego Bay through a storm drain. The cause of the separation of the flange was not determined.

I.3.1.2 Hazard Assessment

To assess the hazard of an oil spill, COMNAVBASE San Diego has selected the most demanding and challenging scenario presented by the Marine Transportation Related (MTR), and Non Transportation Related (NTR) worst case planning volume. By demonstrating the capacity to respond to the most challenging spill planning volume, responding to a less demanding spill will be shown as to be within the capability of the command.

The most challenging worst case spill planning volume within the COMNAVBASE San Diego AOR is represented by the NTR component of the FISC Pt Loma complex facility.

The FISC Pt. Loma Fuel Depot receives 86% of its product by tankers, and 99.5% of the facility's total receipts are composed of Group 1 product (JP-5 and DFM). The worst case calculations are depicted in Tables I-9 and I-10. The planning volumes were developed as follows:

NTR. The FISC Pt. Loma complex is composed of 48 storage tanks (24 above ground and 24 below ground), three consumer tanks, and six miscellaneous tanks. The tanks vary in size from 186 bbls to 53,375 bbls. The tank farm terrain is hilly and the highest tanks are located at the 200 foot level.

The four Fuel Oil Recovered (FOR) tanks (T-276 A, B, C, & D) have insufficient capacity to contain the volume of the tanks plus 3½ inches of rainfall (25 year storm). Each of the FOR tanks holds 714 bbls of fuel. All remaining above-ground tanks have adequate secondary containment, consisting of concrete block and earthen dikes that are coated to prevent erosion damage. The tank farm is partially protected by a moat that separates the tank farm from Rosecrans Street and prevents further runoff into San Diego Bay.

The largest single tank is T-43 (53,375 bbls) is used to store DFM. The NTR worst case planning volume is based on tank T-43, plus tanks T-276 A, B, C, & D (714 bbls each). The calculations are located in Table I-9 and Table I-10.

MTR. The loading arms on the fuel pier are connected to the shoreside facilities primarily by two pipelines (10" & 16") that run along the pier to valves within the first containment, and to a pump house which is manned at all times during transfer operations.

The 10" pipeline operates JP-5 with an average receipt rate of 12,000 BPH. The 16" pipeline operates DFM, with a receipt rate of 9,000 BPH. The distance of the pipeline from the loading arm to the first tank is approximately ½ mile. It is estimated that a leak in the MTR pipelines would be detected and that the product flow would be secured within 10 minutes.

Insert Table I-9, and I-10: worst case planning volume [top]

I.3.1.3 Vulnerability Assessment

The San Diego coastal area contains numerous areas that would be sensitive to an oil spill incident, from an environmental, economic and historic perspective.

All the rivers and lagoons in the San Diego coastal zone contain sensitive wildlife habitat. While not in the 5 NM planning distance for Group 1 fuel, South San Diego Bay is a highly sensitive resource area. Also, the Tijuana River area is an exceptionally sensitive marshland, hosting rare and endangered species of birds and plants.

The coastal zone areas provide habitat for numerous wildfowl and other wildlife including several endangered species, such as; the California Brown Pelican, California Least Tern, Snowy Plover, Light-Footed Clapper Rail, Belding's Savannah Sparrow and Green Sea Turtle.

Numerous economically sensitive water intakes, commercial and recreational marinas, and parks and recreational areas are located within San Diego Bay.

Specific Sensitive Areas within the five mile Planning Distance are identified in Section I.3.2.5, and a detailed description is contained in the Area Contingency Plan (ACP).

I.3.1.4 Risk Assessment

The NTR Planning Volume is based upon a complete structural failure of the largest single aboveground tank, and all additional tanks that do not have adequate secondary containment. Such an event could occur as the result of an earthquake. However, the San Diego area is less prone to earthquakes of this magnitude than many other parts of California.

For the MTR portion of the FISC facility the most probable opportunity for a spill is during transfer operations with a ship or barge alongside the fuel pier. Spills during transfer operations can result from hose leaks, tank overfill, ship separation from the pier damaging the loading arms, or collision of a vessel with the pier damaging the pipelines. When there are no transfer operations in progress the pipelines on the pier are empty. The proximity of sensitive environmental and economic areas makes rapid detection, securing of the source, and containment imperative.

I.3.1.5 Seasonal Considerations

San Diego enjoys mild weather almost all year. Freezing temperatures rarely occur. Winds are predominately from WNW to NW. Over 60% of the days that have a 90^o or higher temperature occur during September and October. Dry easterly winds predominately occur during these months. High temperatures are usually accompanied by very low humidity, often below 20%, and occasionally below 10%. Strong winds and gales associated with the Pacific, or tropical storms, are infrequent. Seasonal rainfall is about 10 inches. Most of the precipitation occurs during winter (85% between November and March). The spring and summer will experience nighttime and early morning cloudiness. The fall and winter months can experience considerable fog. Visibility is usually good and thunderstorms are rare.

The mean range of tide is 4.0 feet, and a range of about 8.0 feet may occur at time of maximum tides. The velocity of the current near the entrance of the channel varies from ½ to 5 knots. During an ebb tide a cross current deflection can be experienced at Ballast Point.

I.3.2 Event [top]

I.3.2.1 Situation

The FISC Pt. Loma worst case spill planning volume is based upon a catastrophic failure of the largest single aboveground tank that is in secondary containment, plus four FOR tanks with inadequate secondary containment. Under extremely devastating circumstances, it may be possible that these tanks could experience a catastrophic failure. Should such an event occur, the location of the tanks are sufficiently close to San Diego Bay, and runoff drains, that a spill of this volume, transported by gravity, will enter San Diego Bay via the storm drains and overland flow across Rosecrans Street.

I.3.2.2 Location

FISC Pt. Loma Tank Farm.

I.3.2.3 Type and Amount of Spill

56,231 bbls (2,361,702 gals) of DFM from tanks T-43, and T-276 A, B, C, & D.

I.3.2.4 Can Pollution Source Be Secured?

The pollution source cannot be secured. The spill scenario represents a complete and catastrophic rupture of tanks T-43, T-276 A, B, C, & D at the tank farm.

I.3.2.5 Sensitive Areas At Risk

As with any spill, the considerations for human life and safety are always paramount. After safety considerations have been addressed, the specific environmental and economic areas that are identified for protection are determined by the Unified Command, and will be influenced by the specific dynamics of each spill. The list below identifies the environmental and economically sensitive areas that may be impacted by a pollution incident the below list is displayed. Derived from information contained in the ACP, it lists sensitive areas that are within the five-mile planning distance, or might reasonably be impacted.

Priority 1- Protection of human health and safety, will include oil contamination of any power plant or drinking water intakes, and public use areas that may be affected by hazardous fumes.

Environmentally Sensitive Areas

(Area is listed with the approximate length of boom required for protection.)

Priority A

• 7-019 Entrance to San Diego Bay (6,000' pri, 4,500' sec)

• 7-020 USN Marine Mammals Research Center (750')

• 7-021 Naval Training Center (750')

• 7-022 U.S. Navy Amphibious Base (750')

• 7-023 U.S. Navy Delta Beach (7,500')

• 7-028 Tijuana River (dike)

Priority B

• 7-018 Point Loma Harbor seals

• Economically Sensitive Areas

• (The areas are listed according to category of facility)

Priority D

• 7-101 Kelco (washing kelp)

• 7-102 Naval Station (serves salt water system)

• 7-103 NASSCO(dry dock flooding)

• 7-106 San Diego Gas & Electric (cooling)

• 7-109 San Diego Gas & Electric (cooling)

Priority E

• 7-121 10th Ave Marine Terminal Water front terminal

• 7-123 B Street Pier/Broadway Pier Water front terminal

• 7-124 NASSCO Drydock

• 7-125 Campbell Industries Drydock

• 7-128 Driscoll Boat Works Drydock

• 7-129 Kettenburg Marine Drydock

• 7-130 Continental Maritime Drydock

• 7-131 Southwest Marine Drydock

• 7-132 Neilsen Beaumont Drydock

• 7-133 Shelter Island Boatyard Drydock

• 7-285 Shelter Island Recreational Area

• 7-286 La Playa Recreational Area

• 7-287 Cabrillo National Monument Recreational Area

• 7-288 Spanish Landing Park Recreational Area

• 7-289 Harbor Island Recreational Area

• 7-290 Embarcadero Recreational Area

• 7-291 Maritime Museum Recreational Area

• 7-292 Embarcadero Marina Park Recreational Area

• 7-293 Bay View Park Recreational Area

• 7-294 Harbor View Park Recreational Area

• 7-295 Centennial Park Recreational Area

• 7-296 Coronado Tidelands Reg Park Recreational Area

• 7-297 Glorietta Bay Park Recreational Area

• 7-298 Coronado Shores Beach Recreational Area

• 7-299 L.M. "Pop" Pepper Park Recreational Area

• 7-157 to 7-171 Shelter Island Area Marina

• 7-172 to 7-179 Harbor Island Area Marina

• 7-180 to 7-181 Embarcadero Area Marina

• 7-182 to 7-190 Commercial Fishing Marinas Marina

• 7-191 to 7-198 Commercial Basin Area Marina

• 7-199 to 7-204 Coronado Area Marina

I.3.2.6 Time of Year

Early winter, i.e., November/December.

I.3.2.7 On-Scene Weather

Prevailing northerly to northwesterly winds, 10 knots, with gusts to 15 knots, one hour after the beginning of an outgoing tide, air temperature 15^o C, water temperature 10^oC.

I.3.3 Initial Actions [top]

I.3.3.1 Notifications

Notification commences as soon as the spill is discovered. Proper federal and state authorities are notified in accordance with Chapter 1 and Appendix A of this instruction. Procedures specified in this section also include notification of the COMNAVBASE San Diego, as the NOSC, and response teams from FISC Point Loma, NAVSTA San Diego, NAS North Island, and NAB Coronado.

Once notified, COMNAVBASE San Diego confirms that the NRC and the state OSC were notified by FISC San Diego, immediately notifies the NOSC Spill Management Team, and issues an OPREP-3 report. COMNAVBASE San Diego also notifies the Federal OSC, the Captain of the Port (COTP) for MSO San Diego.

I.3.3.2 Activation of Response

Activation of the FISC response team occurs immediately upon notification of the spill. Upon notification, COMNAVBASE San Diego activates the NOSC Spill Management Team, and requests Navy SUPSALV to immediately begin preparing equipment for mobilization from the Stockton, CA, ESSM pollution base. Due to the spill volume, COMNAVBASE San Diego activates the response teams from NAVSTA San Diego, NAS North Island, and NAB Coronado immediately to assist in the response operations.

COMNAVBASE San Diego requests activation of the Unified Command in accordance with the San Diego Area Contingency Plan (ACP). The Federal OSC, COTP San Diego, is briefed on all initial personnel and equipment activation efforts. The Federal OSC may elect to activate additional local assets, including the DESMI 250 under his direction, and the OWOCRS belonging to the Pacific Strike Team (PST). The Federal OSC may also consider activating the assets of Clean Coastal Waters, or other regional commercial contractors (see Table I-15).

I.3.3.3 Initial On-Scene Investigation, Evaluation and Recommendation

The FISC Pt. Loma FIC immediately begins site assessment upon notification of the spill event. Due to the spill volume, an immediate site assessment will be required in at least three general locations: (1) the Point Loma Tank Farm where the spill occurs; (2) the natural collection and containment areas immediately down-gradient of the tank farm; (3) the drainage outfalls into San Diego Bay.

The FISC Pt. Loma FIC provides the NOSC with an updated spill volume estimate and an initial site assessment, including the locations of oil on land and in the bay. The NOSC confirms the local tide and weather conditions and notifies NAVSTA San Diego, NAS North Island, and NAB Coronado to activate their response teams and assist in the response operations. Additionally, COMNAVBASE San Diego requests SUPSALV assets.

I.3.3.4 Initial Response Actions and Strategies

The first priority in responding to this spill is to provide maximum protection to the residents of San Diego, and to the responders and other emergency personnel. Due to the location and volume of the spill, and prevailing weather and tide conditions, the personnel at the Naval Research and Development (NRD) are evacuated immediately, and consideration will be given to personnel from the SUBASE at Point Loma should the potential for hazardous fumes warrant evacuation.

Concurrent with public safety evacuations, the Naval Station fire department performs an initial site assessment to determine the fire hazards associated with free product on land and around structures. The initial response strategy is to contain as much oil on land as possible, and to prevent more oil from reaching the bay via overland flow. COMNAVBASE Disaster Control Plans may be activated to protect human health and safety.

The immediate strategy for on-the-water response is to contain and recover as much oil as possible near the source of entry into the bay. The overall strategy is to prevent oil from spreading farther into Upper San Diego Bay, and to protect the sensitive shorelines and resources in and around the spill location.

The Federal OSC may contact the Chief, Marine Safety Division of the USCG District, and request activation and assembly of the RRT due to the extraordinary nature the incident. The Federal OSC establishes a Unified Command at the COMNAVBASE San Diego Emergency Response Center. Representatives from COMNAVBASE San Diego and FISC Pt. Loma provide personnel to support Unified Command operations. Should additional personnel be required, COMNAVBASE San Diego will request personnel from other local Naval activities in the area.

The NOSC requests the NOAA Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC) to provide a daily computer trajectory analysis based on local predictions of climatological, hydrological, and oceanographic conditions. This request is coordinated with the FOSC, who normally activates the SSC.

The Oiled Wildlife Subcommittee of the RRT is requested through the co-chairs to establish an oiled wildlife rehabilitation center and to provide information on wildlife impacts.

Navy product fuels, including the ones represented in this scenario, are not viable candidates for using dispersants, due to the low specific gravity of these fuels. In situ burning is also unfeasible due to the close proximity of the spilled oil to military facilities, marinas, and housing in the Point Loma area.

To handle the influx of media interest caused by the spill, COMNAVBASE San Diego establishes a Joint Information Bureau (JIB).

In addition to performing containment and recovery, COMNAVBASE San Diego requests that all fishing, tour and pleasure boating in the Upper Bay area be curtailed. COMNAVBASE San Diego also requests that movement of vessels that are located in the immediate spill areas be restricted to mission essential vessels only.

I.3.4 Spill Response Organizations [top]

I.3.4.1 Initial Response

Initial spill response actions is conducted by the FIC, (FISC Point Loma) and supported by the FIC's Incident Command System (ICS) (see the FISC FRP, ERAP, Tab E). Inherent in the ICS structure is the ability to expand and contract as the dynamics of the spill warrant. Initially, COMNAVBASE San Diego provides assistance to the FIC in areas that are beyond the capability of FISC Pt. Loma. As the NOSC, COMNAVBASE San Diego assumes direct control of the spill response when it becomes evident that the capabilities of the facility have been exceeded, as in the case of this worst case discharge.

The organizational duties and responsibilities of the COMNAVBASE San Diego NOSC Response Management Team, which operates in a unified incident command system type organization, is described in detail in Chapter 4.

Initial spill response will be provided by the FISC response team. The on-water assets utilized by the FISC response team are contained in Table I-12. The response team skimmer is located at the Pt. Loma quay wall and can be activated in less than one hour.

I.3.4.2 Additional Response Organizations

Additional response assets are required to meet planning volume requirements. Additional assets will come from local Naval assets and Navy SUPSALV.

The additional assets from local Naval facilities are listed in Table I-13, along with the parent command and response time. The assets of Navy SUPSALV located in Stockton will be activated and deployed to the spill site.